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Municipalities' Increased Susceptibility to Antitrust Liability: Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.' — Section one of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act' prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . "3 This provision,
if it was applicable not only to the activities of private industry and individuals,
but also to those of government, would serve to restrict social and economic
regulation. The Supreme Court, however, perhaps in recognition of this diffi-
culty, created the so-called "state action exemption" to the antitrust law in
Parker v. Brown. 4 In Parker, the Court held that a state statute authorizing and
directing an allegedly anticompetitive marketing program was not invalidated
by the Sherman Act. 5
 Over time, the Court has considered the applicability of
the state action exemption to various forms of government related activity. 6 In
so doing, the Court developed two requirements which must be satisfied in
order for the exemption to apply. There must be a clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed state policy authorizing the anticompetitive activity, and
active supervision of that policy by the state.'
Any test for establishing the applicability of the state action exemption will
be applied to various forms of government related activity. The degree and
type of government involvement can vary in many ways. The mechanical ap-
plication of any given test is likely to cause problems in some situations. in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 8 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with such a situation: the applicability of the state action exemption to
the activity of a home rule municipality. A home rule municipality is a
municipality to which the state has granted full power over matters of local con-
cern. 9 In Community Communications, the City Council had passed an ordinance
' 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Id.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
5
 Id. at 350-51.
6
 The Court has considered the applicability of the exemption to: (1) private activity
directed or authorized by the state, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (exemp-
tion not applicable to private utility's allegedly anticompetitive program mandated by tariff
which utility filed with state). Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (exemption
not applicable to county bar association's publication of minimum fee schedule), (2) municipal
activity, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (exemption not
applicable to anticompetitive activities of publicly owned utility), and (3) activity of the state act-
ing as sovereign, California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass' n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (exemption not applicable to state statute which enforced private price control agree-
ments). New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (exemption
applicable to activity of state board which could prohibit establishment or relocation of new car
dealerships under certain circumstances); Bates y. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ex-
emption applicable to state's prohibition of advertising by lawyers).
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
e 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
9 See COLO. CONS•. art. XX, 5 6 (1980). See, e.g., Four County Metropolitan Capital
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which prohibited a cable television company from expanding its operations for
a period of three months. 1 ° Community Communications Co. challenged the
ordinance under the antitrust laws, and the city of Boulder claimed that it was
exempt from such laws under the state action doctrine." The Court then ap-
plied its test in a straightforward manner and held that municipal activity is ex-
empt from the antitrust laws only if the activity is action of the state acting in its
sovereign capacity, or municipal action in furtherance of a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy favoring regulation over free competi-
tion: 2
By the Supreme Court's straightforward application of its test, the Court
indicated that municipalities will not be exempt from the antitrust laws unless
the state has an express policy allowing municipalities to act in an allegedly an-
ticompetitive manner. This requirement could' have a large impact on the
abilities of municipalities, particularly home rule municipalities, to effectively
govern themselves. This result is obtained because the Court, in its mechanical
application of its test, failed to take into account the fact that their test might
not always produce logical results when applied to different types of govern-
ment related activities (sovereign state activity, municipal activity, and private
activity directed by the state). In particular, the Court failed to fully examine
the distinctive characteristics of home rule municipalities, and the effect these
characteristics should have on the applicability of the state action exemption.
This casenote will analyze the Court's decision in Community Communica-
tions and argue that the straightforward application of the Court's test produces
a result that is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the state action ex-
emption. This casenote will begin with a brief examination of the historical
development of the Parker state action exemption, particularly considering City
of Lafayette v. Lousiana Power & Light Co., 13 the only previous case in which the
Court dealt with the applicability of the exemption to municipal activity. Sec-
tion I will conclude with an examination of how the test the Court used
developed." The casenote will then examine the Court's analysis, and applica-
tion of its test in Community Communications. 15 The casenote will demonstrate
that the test the Court used to determine the applicability of the state action ex-
emption to Boulder cannot rationally be applied to all types of state, private
and municipal activity." The result of the Court's failure to fully consider the
special home rule status of the city of Boulder will also be examined.i 7 This
t° Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 45-46.
" Id. at 46-47.
' 2 Id. at 52.
13 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
' See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 75-125 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 126-166 and accompanying text.
' 1 See infra notes 167-188 and accompanying text.
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casenote will conclude by considering the serious implications the Court's deci-
sion has for both home rule municipalities and state-municipal relations."'
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
A. Parker v. Brown
In order to fully understand the Court's decision in Community Communica-
tions, it is necessary to examine the development of the "state action exemp-
tion" from the antitrust laws. The exemption was first clearly announced by
the Supreme Court in a 1943 decision, Parker a. Broum.' 9 In Parker, the Court
considered the validity of a California statute which authorized the establish-
ment of proration programs for marketing agricultural products. 2° These
marketing programs were designed to restrict competition among the growers
in order to maintain high prices:2 ' Brown, a producer and packer of raisins, a
product for which such a proration program had been established, challenged
the validity of the act. 22
In deciding whether California's marketing plans were in violation of the
Sherman Act, the Court considered the nature of the state's program. The
Court was convinced the proration program was an act of the state govern-
ment, deriving its "authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the
state .... "23 Next, the Court examined the Sherman Act, finding "no sugges-
tion" of any Congressional purpose to restrain state action in the act's legisla-
tive history. 24 The Court viewed the Sherman Act as a prohibition on individ-
ual and corporate but not state action. 25
 The Court therefore held that the
Sherman Act does not restrain state action, or official action directed by the
" See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
' 9
 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although this is the first case which clearly states the exemp-
tion, earlier cases had foreshadowed the decision. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904);
Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
25 Parker, 317 U.S. at 344. The Court considered the validity of the California Agricul-
tural Prorate Act, ch. 754, Statutes of California of 1933 at 1969 (as amended). Id.
" Id. at 346. The program was administered by a program committee, whose members
were chosen by the state Director of Agriculture, subject to the approval of the Agricultural Pro-
rate Advisory Committee (whose members were appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
state senate). Id. The act also provided a penalty for violations of any proration program. Id. at
347.
22
 Id. at 344. Ironically, Brown initially challenged the program only on the theory that
the program interfered with his constitutional right of interstate commerce. Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 586 (1976) (discussion of procedural history of Parker). Just before the
Court heard oral argument on the commerce clause issue, the Court held, in Georgia v. Evans,
316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942), that a state was a person within the meaning of § 7 of the Sherman
Act. Id, at 586-87. The Court immediately scheduled Parker for reargument, and specifically
asked the parties to consider whether the Agricultural Prorate Act was invalidated by the Sher-
man Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, or any other act of Congress. Id. at 586-88.
22 Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
" Id. at 351.
25 Id. at 352. The Court recognized, however, that the state cannot immunize private
individuals who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing their violation of the act. Id. at 351.
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state's legislature. 26 The Court indicated this conclusion was required by the
principles of federalism: "[in] a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitu-
tionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Con-
gress.""
In Parker, the Supreme Court therefore clearly stated that the prohibitions
of the Sherman Act do not apply to legislatively directed activity of a state. It is
important to note, however, that the Parker Court only dealt with the narrow
issue of whether the acts of a state agency, taken pursuant to authority granted
by the state legislature, were invalid under the Sherman Act. The Court did
not consider the broader issue of the applicability of the Sherman Act to either
private action taken pursuant to a legislative command, or to municipa.126 ac-
tion. With the limited type of state activity the Court considered, however, the
Court repeatedly emphasized that to qualify for exemption from the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act, an agency's action must be directed by the state. 29
Despite the clear commitment of the Court to the requirement of state direction
for the exemption to be applicable, Parker left unanswered many questions
about the extent of the state action doctrine.
Despite this uncertainty about the scope of the Parker exemption," the
Court declined to reexamine the doctrine for over thirty years. Eventually,
however, the Court began to examine the limits of the Parker state action exemp-
tion, in cases that considered the applicability of the exemption to allegedly an-
ticompetitive private activity which the state was to some extent involved in, 3 '
25 Id, at 350-51.
r Id. at 351.
" The only time the Court mentioned municipalities in Parker was in a statement which
indicated that if a state or its municipalities became a participant in a private agreement in
restraint of trade, then the Sherman Act would be violated. Id. at 351-52. Perhaps the logical in-
ference to be drawn from this statement is that municipalities should be treated like states when
no private agreement is involved. Note, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.: Will
Municipal Antitrust Liability Doom Effective State-Local Government Relations?, 36 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 129, 143 (1979).
29 The Court states: "The Sherman Act ... gives no hint that it was intended to re-
strain state action or official action directed by a state." Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. "[Nothing sug-
gests the Sherman Act's] purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature." Id, at 350-51 (emphasis added). The proration program was not in-
valid because it "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the
state.... " Id. at 350.
'° See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-11
(1972). Professor Handler concluded the Parker doctrine was in a state of "murky confusion." Id.
at 18.
3 ' In 1975, the Court considered the applicability of the state action exemption to the
allegedly anticompetitive activities of a county bar association and a state bar association in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court concluded the state action doc-
trine did not exempt the county bar association's publication of, or the state bar association's en-
forcement of, minimum fee schedules from the antitrust laws because the associations' anticom-
petitive activities were not compelled by the state acting as sovereign. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a sharply divided Court held
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and allegedly anticompetitive sovereign state activity." In 1978, the Court was
first confronted with a case that required consideration of whether the Parker ex-
emption applied to the anticompetitive activities of municipalities.
B. The Application of the Parker Doctrine to Municipalities:
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co." dealt with the alleged anti-
trust violations of a municipally owned utility. 34 The Court was sharply divided
over the applicability of the state action exemption to this type of municipal ac-
tivity." The plurality opinion considered the Parker doctrine as it had been
modified by previous cases." The plurality believed the doctrine of federalism
was of primary importance in Parker, reasoning that the Parker exemption was
based upon state sovereignty. 37 The plurality therefore reasoned that because
the basis for the Parker exemption was that the antitrust laws were not intended
to apply to sovereign states, the exemption could not be extended to
municipalities." The plurality noted that municipalities are not themselves
sovereign and are not treated as the equivalents of states. 39
that the state action exemption was not applicable to Detroit Edison's private anticompetitive ac-
tivity which the state had authorized and arguably had mandated. A plurality of the Court stated
the Parker exemption applied only to official action, and not private action. Cantor, 428 U.S. at
591. A concurring Justice maintained that the Court must focus on the challenged activity, and
not merely the identity of the parties in determining the applicability of the exemption. Id. at 604.
32 In Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court held that the Parker ex-
emption was applicable to a statutory state bar regulation that restricted advertising by attorneys
because the statute restricting advertising was the act of a sovereign state. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
33 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
" Id. at 391.92. The municipality had allegedly conspired to engage in sham litigation
against Louisiana Power & Light Co. to delay construction of a nuclear power plant, to eliminate
competition within municipal boundaries, and to exclude competition in certain markets. Id. at
392 n.6.
" Justice Brennan authored an opinion that was joined totally by Justices Marshall,
Powell and Stevens. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391. Justice Marshall also filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 417. Chief Justice Burger joined Part I of Justice Brennan's opinion, making that
part of justice Brennan's opinion the opinion of the Court. Id. at 394-408. Chief Justice Burger
also filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. Id. at 418..Justice Stewart
authored a dissenting opinion that was joined totally by Justices White and Rehnquist, and
joined partially by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 426. Justice Blackmun also filed his own dissenting
opinion. Id. at 441,
" City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 409-10 (plurality opinion). The plurality specifically ex-
amined the Court's reasoning in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Goldfarb, the Court had held the state action ex-
emption was not applicable to the state bar association (which had been enforcing minimum fee
schedules), even though the state bar was a state agency, because the minimum fee schedules
were not directed by the state acting as sovereign. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-91. In Bates, the
Court held the exemption was applicable because the restrictions on advertising by lawyers (the
alleged anticompetitive activity) was compelled by the direction of the state acting as sovereign.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
" City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 (plurality opinion).
as Id.
99 Id.
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Because municipalities are not treated as sovereigns, and because of a con-
cern that anticompetitive activity by cities could wreak havoc on the national
economy, the plurality refused to presume that Congress intended to exclude
anticompetitive municipal activity from the coverage of the Sherman Act."
The plurality therefore concluded that the Parker doctrine only exempts "anti-
competitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as
sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to a state policy to displace com-
petition with regulation or monopoly public service." 4 ' The plurality empha-
sized, however, that their interpretation of the doctrine does not mean the state
must enact specific detailed legislation to authorize municipalities to act anti-
competitively. 42 It would be sufficient if, from the authority given in a particu-
lar area, it can be found that the state legislature "contemplated" the type of
anticompetitive activity engaged in by the municipality."
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger rejected the plurality's ap-
proach to the Parker doctrine. The Chief Justice made a distinction between a
municipality's proprietary and governmental activities." The opinion empha-
sized two features of the municipal activity in City of Lafayette which supported
this distinction. First, Chief Justice Burger argued that the critical factor in City
of Lafayette was that the municipality was clearly engaged in a business activity
from which a profit was realized." Nothing in the Parker doctrine, in this view,
indicated this type of proprietary municipal activity should be exempt from the
antitrust laws. 46 Second, Chief Justice Burger recognized that although the city
of Lafayette was a municipality, the dispute between the parties was no dif-
ferent from an ordinary dispute among competitors in the same market.'"
Burger thus concluded that in this case, for purposes of applying the antitrust
laws, the city of Lafayette should be treated in the same manner as Louisiana
Power & Light Company." Whether Congress intended to exempt the type of
" Id. at 412-13.
4 ' Id. at 413.
42 Id. at 415.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
45 Id.
46
 "There is nothing in Parker ... or its progeny, which suggests that a proprietary
enterprise with the inherent capacity for economically disruptive anticompetitive effects should
be exempt from the Sherman Act merely because it is organized under state law as a municipali-
ty." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In addition to making a distinc-
tion between proprietary and governmental activity, Chief justice Burger questioned the Court's
ability to determine congressional intent or purpose in passing the Sherman Act. Id, at 420. Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice, the Sherman Act was adopted at a time when a very restrictive view
of interstate commerce prevailed. Id. He reasoned that Congress could not have imagined many
of the situations to which the Sherman Act is being applied today. Id. (As the notion of interstate
commerce has expanded, the Court has allowed the reach of the Sherman Act to expand in a
similar manner. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 232-33 (1948).)
City.of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
48 Id. at 424. Louisiana Power & Light Co., as a private utility, was subject to the pro-
hibitions of the antitrust laws. Id.
September 1983]	 CASENOTES
	 1405
anticompetitive conduct engaged in by the city of Lafayette was not a factor in
this analysis because "private" activity of the state (as opposed to sovereign ac-
tivity) has always been subject to regulation under the commerce clause.'"
In dissent, Justice Stewart maintained that the Parker exemption was ap-
plicable. 5° Justice Stewart found fault with both the plurality's and the Chief
Justice's opinions for failing to recognize the distinction Parker made between
private and governmental action." According to Justice Stewart's interpreta-
tion of Parker, this distinction was the important distinction made in that case,
and not the distinction made between state legislative actions and the actions of
other governmental units. 52
 The Justice also reprimanded the plurality for mis-
construing precedents. 53 Justice Stewart then criticized the governmental-
proprietary approach embraced by the Chief Justice for two reasons. First,
Stewart rejected such a distinction, reasoning that a government is not partly
public and partly private. 54
 Second, on a practical level, Justice Stewart argued
the governmental-proprietary distinction is incapable of precise definition, thus
making the distinction virtually impossible to apply." The dissent concluded
with a consideration of policy arguments, warning that the decision in City of
Lafayette will diminish the extent to which a state can share its power with a
municipality, cause excessive judicial interference in governmental decisions,
and impose staggering costs on municipal governments. 56
49 Id. at 422. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-86 (1936).
Burger also notes that this reasoning was consistent with the Court's opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National League of Cities, the Court held
that the extension of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municipal employees was
not within the power granted to Congress by the commerce clause. National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 852. Congress did not have the authority because the Act operated to "directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
Id. Thus, Burger claimed this supported his proprietary-governmental distinction.
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 423-24 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
In addition to Chief Justice Burger, others have noted the interesting relation between
the Parker doctrine and National League of Cities. One district court has reasoned that perhaps there
are situations in which a state's activity would not be exempt under the Parker doctrine, but the
activity would be protected by National League of Cities analysis. Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13,
18 (E.D. Mich. 1979). If the state action exemption was inapplicable, the state's activity could
still be protected if the activity's prohibition would displace the state's ability to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions. Id. See Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liabili-
ty in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 341 (1980).
5° City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
5 ' Id. at 428.
51 Id. at 429.
" Id. at 431-32. Justice Stewart argued that Goldfarb, see supra note 31, is inapplicable to
City of Lafayette because Goldfarb involved essentially private activity. Id. at 431 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Likewise, Stewart noted that Cantor, see supra note 31, can be distinguished from City
of Lafayette, in that Cantor held that private action must be compelled by the state legislature in
order to be exempt from the Sherman Act. Id. at 431 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332
U.S. 380, 383-84 (1947)).
" Id. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 434-41. In his separate dissent, Justice Blackmun concluded the wide ranging
opinions of the members of the Court by emphasizing the extent to which municipalities could be
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Because of the five separate opinions, it is difficult to determine the
significance of City of Lafayette. Although the plurality maintained that the
Parker exemption could not extend to municipalities because they are not
sovereign, procedurally the Court's holding on the applicability of the Parker
doctrine is limited to the position taken by the member of the Court who con-
curred on the narrowest grounds." One commentator has noted that Chief
Justice Burger's pivotal vote against exempting the city from the antitrust laws
limits the precedential force of City of Lafayette to proprietary activities of mun-
icipalities."
An examination of the subsequent interpretations of the City of Lafayette
decision reveals that for the most part, the procedural limitations on the extent
of the holding have not had any effect on other courts' application of the opin-
ion. Generally, the federal courts have adopted the plurality's standards as if
these standards had been the opinion of the Court." In fact, in subsequent
cases dealing with the state action exemption, the Supreme Court itself chose to
follow the plurality opinion. 60 In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.," the Court refined the standard used in City of Lafayette
to a simply stated two prong test. In order for anticompetitive activity to be ex-
harmed by the treble damage penalty mandated by the Sherman Act. Id. at 442-43 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
" See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). With a fragmented Court,
"the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred
in the judgment on the narrowest grounds .... " Id.
58 Taurman, Reflections on City of Lafayette: Applying the Antitrust "State Action" Exemption to
Local Governments, 13 URB. LAW 159, 166 (1981). Mr. Taurman also noted that "it is significant
that five Justices expressed views in City of Lafayette consistent with absolute exemption for cities'
traditional governmental functions." Id.
" See, e.g., Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 719 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978) (the weaker the relationship between the state and the
defendant, the more clearly the state must command the precise action taken by the defendant for
the defendant to enjoy the state action exemption); Highfield Water Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 488 F. Supp. 1176, 1190 (D. Md. 1980) (local governmental activities are exempt if
the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of and such action was taken pursuant
to a state policy to displace competition with regulation); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461
F. Supp, 1025, 1029 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (activities of municipalities and others are exempt only if
undertaken pursuant to acts of the state as sovereign that evince a state policy to displace com-
petition with regulation).
6° In New Motor Vehicle Board of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox, Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), the
first case which considered the extent of the state action exemption subsequent to City of Lafayette,
the Court applied the exemption to the actions of a state board that was authorized, by a state
statute, to prohibit the establishment or relocation of new car dealerships under certain circum-
stances. Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. at 103-04. The Court held the exemption was applicable because the
scheme was clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed by the state and designed to replace
business freedom with regulation. Id. at 109.
61
 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Midcal Aluminum dealt with a state statute which controlled the
pricing of wine by calling for producers and wholesalers to file resale price schedules and pro-
viding penalties for licensees selling wine below the established prices. Id. at 99-100. The state
neither had direct control over the prices established, nor considered the reasonableness of such
prices. Id. at 100.
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empt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine: (1) the restraint on
competition must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy " 62 and (2) the state must "actively supervise" the policy.° This was the
test the Court required the city of Boulder to satisfy in Community Communica-
tions. The reasons why the Court's mechanical application of this test in Com-
munity Communications was both illogical and inconsistent with the underlying
purpose of the Parker doctrine can be more easily understood if the development
of the Court's clearly articulated test is examined.
C. The State Action Exemption Before Community Communications:
The Development of the Clearly Articulated Test
The clearly articulated test that the Court used to determine the applica-
bility of the Parker exemption to the city of Boulder in Community Communications
was developed in a series of cases dealing with a wide range of governmentally
related activities, such as sovereign state activities, municipal activities and
private activities in which the state was involved. The language which was to
develop into the Court's clearly articulated standard first appeared in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona." In Bates, the Court held that a statutory state bar regula-
tion restricting advertising by lawyers was exempt from the antitrust laws
under the Parker doctrine because the statutory restriction was the act of a
sovereign state.° The Court, however, also felt compelled to distinguish the
earlier case of Cantor v. Detroit Edison Company. 66 Bates dealt with state activity,
while Cantor had dealt with private activity in which the state was to some ex-
tent involved. Instead of noting the difference between state activity and
private activity, the Supreme Court distinguished Cantor by declaring that it is
"significant that the state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and
that the state's supervision is so active." 67 This language from Bates later
developed into the Court's test for determining the applicability of the state ac-
tion exemption. With Bates, the Court began to develop its technique of apply-
ing the rationale developed in previous cases to subsequent cases involving the
state action exemption, regardless of whether the subsequent case involved the
same type of activity (private, state or municipal).
Consequently, in City of Lafayette, where the Court confronted a type of ac-
tivity it had not considered before — the allegedly anticompetitive acts of a
municipality — the plurality felt compelled to apply the Parker doctrine as it
" Id. at 105.
63 Id. In applying this test in Alideal Aluminum, the Court held the exemption was not
applicable because the state was not actively supervising the program and was merely enforcing
price schedules determined by private parties. Id.
64 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
65
 Id. at 360.
66 428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Cantor, a divided Court held the state action exemption was
not applicable to the allegedly anticompetitive activity of a private utility which was authorized
by a tariff the utility had filed with the state. Id. at 591-92.
67
 Bates, 433 U.S. at 362.
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had been explicated by Bates. 68 The plurality concluded that in order to avail it-
self of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, a municipality must
have acted pursuant to a state policy to displace competition. 69 This approach
is strikingly similar to the standard the Court announced in Bates, a case which
dealt with the activities of a state agency. 7°
After City of Lafayette, the Court refined the requirements used to deter-
mine the applicability of the state action exemption to an easily stated two
prong test. The two cases subsequent to City of Lafayette, New Motor Vehicle Board
of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co. , 71 and California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.," were however, limited to the activities of the state act-
ing as sovereign. Both cases were concerned with the validity of state statutes. 73
The test employed by the Court in these decisions was essentially identical to
the language used by the plurality in City of Lafayette. 74 In these cases, therefore,
the Court used essentially the same test in applying the Parker doctrine to the
activity of a municipality (City of Lafayette), and the activity of the state acting as
sovereign (Orrin Fox and Midcal Aluminum). The Court had apparently
developed an all purpose standard, which it used interchangeably in cases con-
cerning different types of challenged activity.
This two pronged standard thus had been established as the test to use to
determine the application of the Parker exemption at the time Community Com-
munications was considered by the Supreme Court. Community Communications,
however, presented the Court with a situation never previously considered —
the applicability of the state action exemption to a home rule municipality.
6' City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408-10. For a brief discussion of Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773
(1975), see supra note 31.
" City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413.
7° See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
7' 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
72 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
73 In Orrin Fox, the Court considered a state statute which gave a state agency the
authority to prohibit the establishment or relocation of a new car dealership under certain cir-
cumstances. Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. at 101-03. In Midcal Aluminum, the Court considered a state
statute by which the state enforced price schedules established by wine producers and whole-
salers. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 99-100.
" In City of Lafayette, it was stated that Bates had emphasized the significance of the fact
that "the state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint as part of a comprehensive
regulatory system, was one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and
that the State's policy was actively supervised by the State Supreme Court as the policymaker."
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion).
In Orrin Fox, the Court stated the "dispositive answer" to the claim that the statute
violated the Sherman Act, was that "the Automobile Franchise Act's regulatory scheme is a
system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfet-
tered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealer-
ships." Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. at 109.
In Midcal Aluminum, the Court stated there were two reqUirements for antitrust immuni-
ty under the Parker doctrine. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105. "First, the challenged restraint
must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy
must be 'actively supervised' by the state itself. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (opi-
nion of Brennan, J.)).
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This casenote will next examine the unique factual situation considered in Com-
munity Communications, and the rationale the Court used to apply its multi-
purpose standard to the activities of a home rule municipality.
II. COMMUNITY COMMUNICATIONS CO. V. CITY OF BOULDER
in Community Communications Co. a. City of Boulder," the Supreme Court ap-
plied the multi-purpose test it had developed to determine if the activities of a
home rule municipality should be exempt from the antitrust laws. The Court
held that municipal activity is exempt, under the Parker doctrine, only if the ac-
tivity is action of the state undertaken in its sovereign capacity, or municipal
activity in furtherance of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy to replace competition with regulation. 76
The city of Boulder is a home rule municipality which has been granted
broad powers over matters of local concern by the Colorado Constitution."
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that Colorado's home rule amend-
ment confers on municipalities "full, complete and exclusive authority" with
respect to local and municipal affairs. 78 The amendment confers every power
possessed by the legislature to authorize municipalities to function in local and
" 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
" Id. at 52.
" COLO. CONsT. art. XX, § 6 (1980). Article XX, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution
states:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand
inhabitants ... are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power .to make,
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic
law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charters and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall
supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any
law of the state in conflict therewith.
Id.
Constitutional home rule amendments are a relatively recent development in the
United States. "Since the end of World War II, it has been adopted by fourteen states .... This
number exceeds by three the number of states which authorized it during what might be called its
formative period (1875-1912)." Vandlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 269, 277 (1968). In 1966, 33 states had home rule amendments in their
constitutions. Id.
As early as 1875, however, the Supreme Court had recognized that a state may give its
municipalities broad powers. "A municipal corporation ... is but a department of the State.
The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of receiving, making it a
miniature State within its locality." Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 544 (1875). See
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1953); New Orleans
Water Works v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471, 481 (1896).
The state of Colorado has fully embraced the concept of home rule. Of the state consti-
tutions with home rule amendments, Colorado's constitution contains one of the broadest and
strongest grants of home rule power to municipalities. YEAR BOOK OF THE STATE OF COL-
ORADO 201 (1961), quoted in Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L.
REV. 321, 359 (1964).
" Four County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 304, 369 P.2d 67, 77 (1962).
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municipal affairs. 79 Under this provision, therefore, a home rule municipality
is not inferior to the state legislature in matters of purely local concern." Fur-
thermore, because municipalities have exclusive authority in matters of local
and municipal concern," the enactment of a municipal ordinance on a purely
local matter supersedes a state statute. 82
Municipalities in Colorado, however, do not have unlimited power and
authority. The Supreme Court of Colorado has recognized that the powers
granted to home rule municipalities by the state are delegated powers;
municipalities may legislate only on matters for which the state has given
municipalities authority." Home rule municipalities are therefore actually a
branch of the state." Except for the express limitations on the state's legislative
power contained in the home rule amendment, the legislative power of the state
is "all embracing." 85 Therefore, in an area that is of both state and local con-
cern, local ordinances cannot preempt state regulatory schemes. a6 In matters of
purely local concern, however, the municipality has exclusive authority, and its
ordinances can supersede conflicting state statutes. 87
 In effect, the Colorado
home rule municipality acts as the state in areas of such concern.
In 1964, the Boulder City Council used this broad home rule power to
pass an ordinance granting Colorado Televents, Inc., a revocable, non-exclu-
sive permit to conduct a cable television system within the city." The limits of
cable television technology in 1964 made it feasible for the cable company to
provide service to only 20% of the city's population. 89 By 1980, however, tre-
78 Id. at 294, 369 P.2d at 72.
°° COLO. CONST. art. XX, 5 6 (1980). See also Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne,
Colo	 618 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1980).
81 Four County Metropolitan Dist., 149 Colo. at 304, 369 P.2d at 77.
8' COLO. CONST. art. XX, 5 6 (1980). See Davis v. City of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 35,
342 P.2d 674, 676 (1959). See Bennion v. City of Denver, 180 Colo. 213, 215, 504 P.2d 350, 351
(1972). For a state statute to be superseded by a local ordinance, two requirements must be met.
The state statute and the local ordinance must be in conflict, and the ordinance must pertain to a
purely local matter. Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 467, 484 P.2d 1204, 1205 (1971). Where both
of these conditions exist, the state statute is without effect within the jurisdiction of the home rule
city. Id.
83
 City of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 46-47, 329 P.2d 441, 444 (1958). See COLO.
CONST, art. XX, 5 6 (1980).
" Id. at 48, 329 P.2d at 445. The court also stated that the "United States Constitution
provides for a national government with a federal system of states. All powers not expressly
granted to the federal government are reserved to the states or to the people. United States Constitu-
tion, Tenth Amendment.... Clearly our federal system does not envisage as a part thereof city-
states." Id.
" Id. at 47, 329 P.2d at 444.
" Century Electric Serv. and Repair, Inc. v. Stone, 193 Colo. 181, 183-84, 564 P.2d
953, 955 (1977), Statutes dealing with matters of statewide concern operate to the exclusion of
local ordinances. Id. at 183, 564 P.2d at 955.
" See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
88 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 44. The license was assigned to the petitioner,
Community Communications Co., in 1966. Id.
" Id. Service was originally provided to the University Hill area of the city, where
regularly broadcast television signals could not be received. Id. Although the cable company
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mendous improvements in cable technology gave companies the capability of
offering a wide range of programming services to their subscribers, thus mak-
ing the companies' services attractive to the entire city, even to those house-
holds which could receive regularly broadcast programming. 9° These improve-
ments provided Community Communications Co. with a broader market, and
in May 1979, Community Communications informed the City Council that it
planned to expand. 9 '
The improved cable technology also made Boulder an attractive potential
market for other cable television operators. Two months after Community
Communications announced its expansion plans, a newly formed company,
Boulder Communications Co., expressed to the City Council an interest in ob-
taining a permit to provide cable services throughout the city. 92 In response to
these developments, the City Council undertook a review of its cable television
policy. A number of study meetings were held and a consultant was hired to
help the Council formulate a cable television policy." The consultant advised
the Council that it should be concerned about the tendency of a cable system to
become a natural monopoly." Because of this concern, and to allow the City
Council time to draft a cable television ordinance and invite new businesses to
enter the Boulder market, the City Council enacted an "emergency" or-
dinance on December 19, 1979." The ordinance prohibited Community Com-
munications from expanding into other areas of the city for a period of three
months."
Community Communications brought an action in United States District
Court seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the city from restricting the
company's right to expand. 97
 Community Communications claimed the re-
striction by the city violated the Sherman Act." The city maintained it was ex-
empt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine announced in
Parker v. Brown. 99
 The District Court granted the preliminary injunction,
could have provided service to the entire city, there was no market for the company's services,
which consisted of the retransmission of regular television signals, in areas that could receive the
broadcast signals clearly. Id. at 44 n.3.
9° Id. at 44.
9' Id. at 45.
92 Id.
" Community Communications, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo, 1980).
94 Id. The Council was concerned with the fact that Community Communications had
the potential to dominate the market since it was already operating in the city. Id.
" Id.
96
 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 45-46. The Council felt the ordinance was
necessary because Community Communication's continued expansion during the time required
to draft a cable television ordinance would make Boulder a less attractive market for other
operators. Id.
97 Id. at 46-47.
98 Id. at 47. Section one of the Sherman Act declares that "[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.... " 15 U.S.C. 1 (1976).
99 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
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holding that the Parker doctrine was completely inapplicable because govern-
mental action is immune from antitrust liability only when the action is taken
pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, ac-
tively supervised by the state.'"
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court,'°' and
held that the Parker doctrine was applicable because the city was a governmen-
tal entity asserting a governmental, rather than a proprietary interest.'" The
court found that the city of Boulder had satisfied the requirement that the ac-
tion be taken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy actively supervised by the state. 10' The court reasoned the policy re-
quirement was satisfied because Boulder, as a home rule municipality, had
complete authority in matters of local concern.'"
The Supreme Court held the city was not exempt from the antitrust laws
because its action was neither action of the State of Colorado acting in its
sovereign capacity, nor municipal action in furtherance of a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy. '° 5
 The Court rejected the city's argu-
ment that as a home rule municipality the city was acting as the state on mat-
ters of purely local concern. In rejecting this argument the Court stated that the
Parker exemption is a reflection of the principles of federalism,'" and noted that
federalism is a limited scheme, based on a dual system of government which
has no place for sovereign cities.'" The Court emphasized that Parker itself had
recognized this limit of federalism.'" Quoting from Parker, the Court stated
that " 'nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history ... suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature . . . [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's con-
trol over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.' '"" The
Court understood this language from Parker to mean that the Parker Court had
recognized Congress's intention to limit the exemption based on the federalism
principle of state sovereignty."° The Court noted that recent cases"' also reaf-
Community Communications, 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
101 Community Communications, 630 F.2d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1980).
102
 Id. at 708.
'" Id.
104 Id. at 707. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Markey maintained that the policy must be
affirmatively expressed and actively supervised by the state itself. Id. at 719 (Markey, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Markey also would have affirmed the District Court's decision on first amendment
grounds. Id. at 711-14.
'" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52-56.
106 Id. at 53-54.
'° 7 Id. at 53. The Court stated that all sovereign authority in the United States resides
either in the federal government or with the states of the union. Id.
108
 Id. at 53-54.
'" Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51, quoted in Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 54.
I" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 54.
" 1
 The Court cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980), New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978),
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firmed the "intrinsic limits" of the Parker doctrine.'" The Court interpreted
these cases as demonstrating that municipalities are not themselves sovereign,
and thus were only exempt from the antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine to
the extent that they acted "pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy. '113 Applying this test in Community Communications the
Court concluded that Boulder had not acted pursuant to a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy. Boulder claimed that this requirement
was fulfilled by Colorado's Home Rule Amendment, which guaranteed local
autonomy. Under the Home Rule Amendment, Boulder argued, the state had
given Boulder the authority to enact the ordinance, and thus it can be inferred
that the state contemplated that the city would take this type of action. 14 The
Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the state's relationship to the
city's ordinance was one of "precise neutrality."' ' 5 The Court also noted that
acceptance of the city's argument would completely destroy the concept of clear
articulation and affirmative expression that the Court felt the precedents re-
quired. "6
The Court also was not convinced by Boulder's policy arguments that
denial of the Parker exemption would have serious and adverse effects on
municipalities and would unduly burden the federal courts by encouraging an-
titrust suits against municipalities.'" The Court observed that this was merely
an attack on the wisdom of the policy of free market and open competition that
is the basis of the antitrust laws. 18 The Court reiterated that it was simply
holding that if a state has not directed or authorized the anticompetitive action,
the city must obey the antitrust laws." 9 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens particularly emphasized that the issue of an exemption from the anti-
trust laws is different from the issue of a violation of the antitrust laws.'"
Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor, argued there were two serious flaws in the majority's decision.
and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
'" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 54.
us Id.
" 4 Id. at 55.
'" Id.
" 6 Id. at 56. The Court maintained that if a general grant of power was enough to
. satisfy this requirement, different home rule cities could pursue vastly different regulatory
schemes, and yet all the schemes would be the result of a clearly articulated state policy. Id. The
Court found this somewhat illogical. Id.
Having concluded that Boulder had not acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affir-
matively expressed state policy, the Court found it unnecessary to consider a second aspect of the
requirements needed for action to be exempt from the antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine.
Community Communications, 445 U.S. at 51 n.14. In Midcal Aluminum, the Court had focused on
this second requirement of whether the activity was actively supervised by the state. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105.
I" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 56.
'" Id. at 56-57.
" 9 Id. at 57.
120 Id. at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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First, Justice Rehnquist maintained the state action doctrine should be treated
as an example of the preemption doctrine rather than as an exemption.'" Sec-
ond, the dissent expressed amazement over the majority's conclusion that
municipal ordinances are more easily invalidated under the antitrust laws than
state statutes, and that principles of federalism are not implicated when a
federal law invalidates otherwise legal municipal legislation. 122
 The dissent
stated that the key determination to be made in deciding applicability of the ex-
emption is whether the regulation is truly an act of government, and not an act
of regulated private entities. 123 The dissent noted that under the majority's re-
quirements, the Parker exemption is available to municipalities only to the same
extent as the exemption is available to private parties.' 24
 The dissent stated that
this limitation on the availability of the exemption will both seriously alter the
relationship between states and their subdivisions, and will also effectively
destroy the home rule movement by forcing municipalities to cede authority
back to the states.'"
In addition to the dissent's criticisms of the Court's opinion, the Court's
opinion can be criticized because the Court's straightforward application of its
clearly articulated test produced a result that is inconsistent with the underly-
ing purpose of the Parker exemption. Accordingly, this casenote will next
demonstrate that the Court's attempt to apply a single standard to determine
the applicability of the state action doctrine in situations involving private ac-
tivity, municipal activity and state activity leads to a result inconsistent with
the purpose of the exemption in Community Communications because of the great
differences between these types of activities.
III. THE COURT'S CLEARLY ARTICULATED STANDARD
A. Consistent Application to Varying Situations
In developing the standard the Court used in Community Communications to
determine the availability of the state action exemption to the city, 126 the Court
'" Id. at 61.69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). There is a distinction between exemption
and preemption. The exemption doctrine deals with possibly conflicting enactments of a single
sovereign. Handler, Antitrust — 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (1978). The preemption
doctrine deals with possibly conflicting enactments of two different sovereigns. Id. at 1379. One
key difference in the manner in which the courts handle the two doctrines is in the presumptions
the courts make. With exemptions, the presumption is in favor of the antitrust laws and against
implied repeals of these laws by other enactments. Id. at 1380. With the preemption doctrine, the
presumption is that the state law is not superseded by the federal law. Id. See Fox, The Supreme
Court and the Confusion Surrounding the State Action Doctrine, 48 ANTITRUST 1571, 1571-72 (1979);
Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 305, 322 (1980). But
see Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
14-15 (1976).
122 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 70.
12* Id.
'" Id. at 70-71.
176 In order to be exempt from the antitrust laws, the activity must be pursuant to a
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did not examine the important distinctions between state activity, private activ-
ity and municipal activity.'" It would be proper to determine the applicability
of the exemption by using the same "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy" standard in situations involving state activity, private ac-
tivity and municipal activity, as the Court has, if these types of activities were
identical. There are substantial differences, however, between state activity,
private activity and municipal activity. Because of these differences, the ap-
plication of the same standard to these different types of activities produce il-
logical results.
There are apparent differences between state activity, private activity, and
municipal activity. Activities by the state are clearly unique in that they are ac-
tions of a sovereign government. As the Court recognized in Parker, "the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority .... " 1 " The state, although it has ceded some powers to the federal
government through the Constitution, still has inherent authority to act on all
matters that are within its sphere of power.'" A private corporation, however,
is not a sovereign entity, and does not have any inherent authority to act."° A
private corporation's power to act is limited to the powers expressly or implied-
ly granted by the sovereign."' Although it is true that sovereign states may
engage in the same type of activities as private actors, it does not necessarily
follow that such situations eliminate the distinctions between state activity and
private activity. The state, since it draws its power from the people, is generally
politically accountable to the people and concerned with maximizing public
welfare. A private corporation, by comparison, is generally most concerned
with maximizing the benefits of the corporation's shareholders.'" Although a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. Id. at 52.
127 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
28 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
" This concept is the foundation of the doctrine of federalism. The Federalist Papers,
in discussing the Constitution, states that the Constitution "aims only at a partial Union or con-
solidation, [and] the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they before had and which were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to re-
main in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.... The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity
of the state." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
'" "A corporation obtains its powers from the same source as it does its existence,
namely, From the sovereign." 6 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS 5 2477 (perm. ed. 1979).
"' Id.
132 The majority of the Court rejected this type of argument when comparing municipal
and private activity. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-08. The Court felt that although
municipalities are politically accountable, they are not accountable to everybody their activities
may affect. Id. at 405-06. The Court also argued a municipally operated utility had the same pro-
fit maximizing goals as a private utility. Id. at 403-04. This analysis, however, does not apply
equally to states. States are generally accountable to everyone whom their activities affect. If
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sovereign state and a private corporation may use similar means in some situa-
tions, the ultimate end for which the activity is undertaken demonstrates the
clear difference between the two types of activities. The identity and attributes
of the actors necessarily distinguishes sovereign state activity from private ac-
tivity. The private actor, taken to be acting in his own self-interest, is properly
subject to the antitrust laws, despite the fact that his actions may happen to
have socially beneficial effects. The state, however, is expressly attempting to
create socially beneficial results in the name of the public welfare. This general
concern with the public good creates the need for an exemption from the anti-
trust laws.
It has long been recognized that municipalities have a special place in the
scheme of government.'" In effect, municipalities work towards the general
public good in much the same manner as states) 34 Municipalities in certain
respects may be more effective at fulfilling the public good because they have a
greater awareness of local conditions and needs) 35 A municipality's concern
about local needs is one of the major factors which distinguishes a municipal
corporation from a private corporation. A traditional definition of a municipal
corporation is that it is a political body endowed with the right to exercise a por-
tion of the political power of the state.'" Private corporations, although they
states are affecting activities beyond their borders, the problem is an interstate problem, which
Congress may remedy, if it chooses. Even if a state acts pursuant to a goal of profit maximiza-
tion, that profit benefits all residents of the state, and not the small number of investors that
private activity benefits.
'" One of the nation's "Founding Fathers," Thomas Jefferson, recognized the impor-
tance of municipalities: "These little republics ... would be the main strength of the great one.
We owe to them the vigor given to our revolution.... Could I once see this [division of counties
into smaller units], I should consider it as the dawn of the salvation of the republic." People v.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 102 (1871) (opinion of Cooley, J.) (quoting 5 JEFFERSON'S WORKS at
525).
1 " "That a city or town can exercise no other than public powers results from the fact
that it is a public institution created and existing to serve the general interests of the people
residing ... within the city area, not as private individuals but as members of the political socie-
ty." 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 5 1.57 (3d ed. 1971).
Many years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that:
A municipal corporation is a subordinate branch of the domestic government of a
State. It is instituted for public purposes only; and has none of the peculiar qualities
and characteristics of a trading corporation, instituted for purposes of private
gain. „ . Its objects, its responsibilities, and its powers are different. As a local gov-
ernmental institution, it exists for the benefit of the people within its corporate
limits.
Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 468, 475 (1873). See also 1 MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 5 1.60 (3d ed. 1971). But see City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-08.
'" The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of municipalities in serving the
needs of the public. "Their judgment of local needs is made from a more intimate knowledge of
local conditions than that of any other legislative body." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
641 (1951).
136 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 5 2.07a (3d ed. 1971).
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derive their power from the state, do not have any authority to exercise the po-
litical power of the state,'" and are created for non-governmental purposes.'"
Another distinctive characteristic of municipalities is that they have tradi-
tionally been viewed as agents of the state.'" Throughout its history, the Su-
preme Court has consistently stressed that municipal corporations are political
subdivisions, created by the state as "convenient agencies" for exercising
governmental power."{} Viewing municipalities as agents of the state, their ac-
tivities clearly are of a different character than private activity."' Actions of a
municipality can be viewed, in an indirect way, as actions of the state. 12 Al-
though there may be instances when municipal activity appears similar to pri-
vate activity,'" municipal activity will generally be similar to state activity in
that both seek to achieve the same goal — benefiting the public through the use
of governmental power. Nonetheless, municipal activity cannot be equated
"r Id. at 5 2,02.
LIB Id. at 5 2.03. Corporations have been traditionally characterized as either "public"
or "private." All municipal corporations are public corporations, but all public corporations are
not municipal corporations. Id. Both types of corporations derive their existence from the state.
Id. at 5 2.02. In addition to the differences in purposes between private corporations and public
corporations, Fletcher, in his treatise on corporations, stated another distinguishing factor:
A private corporation involves the idea of consent of the individuals who compose it,
and after incorporation cannot be changed or dissolved without their consent, unless
the power to do so is reversed [sic] at the time of creation, or unless it has forfeited
the right to do business or exist by virtue of the abuse or nonuser [sic] of its powers.
On the other hand, a public corporation, being an instrument or means of govern-
ment, is subject to creation or dissolution at the will of the legislative body or
lawmaking power, and in total disregard of the wishes of the members who compose
it.
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS S 58 (perm. ed. 1974).
"9
 See 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 5 1.58 (3d ed. 1971).
140
 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907). See, e.g., City of Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1923); Metropolitan R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia,
132 U.S. 1, 8 (1889); Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 524 (1879). These cases all il-
lustrate the traditional view of municipalities as mere agents of the sovereign states. One com-
mentator has recently noted that because of the increased direct regulatory contact with
municipalities by the federal government, municipalities can no longer automatically be treated
as "synonymous with, or subordinate to," the states. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of
Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U.L. REV. 1, 34 (1982). This commentator maintains
that in recent cases (City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978) and Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), the Court's analysis of municipalities has been "instrumen-
tal" rather than formal, stressing the importance of the respective federal policies and only giving
lip service to the traditional category of municipalities as state instrumentalities. Lee, supra, at 46.
This commentator also noted that in Community Communications, the Court returned to a more for-
malistic approach. Id.
' 41
 The Supreme Court has maintained, however, that in certain situations a munici-
pality can act as a private corporation. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-08. See supra note 132.
142
 In another context, the Supreme Court has equated municipal action with state ac-
tion. "[It] is now beyond question that a State's political subdivision must comply with the Four-
teenth Amendment. The actions of local government are the actions of the state." Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968).
14 ' City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-08.
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with state activity.'" There are limits to municipal authority. As the plurality
in City of Lafayette emphasized, municipalities are not themselves sovereign; 145
they depend on the powers granted to them by the state in order to act. t46
In essence, action by the state fundamentally differs from that of a private
actor because it is directed toward increasing the public good. Consequently,
the compelling need to subject private economic activity to the antitrust laws in
order to advance the public good does not really apply to actions of the state. In
certain respects, municipalities resemble the state; they act in the public good.
The power to do so, however, is derived from the state itself. As a result of
these differences between private, state and municipal activity, there are
various considerations which must be weighed when deciding how the antitrust
laws should apply to each. Given the distinct differences between state activity,
private activity and municipal activity, the same standard should not be used
in each situation to determine if a challenged activity is exempt from the anti-
trust laws under the Parker state action doctrine.
The standard adopted by the Court — that in order for the exemption to
apply there must be both a clearly articulated state policy and active supervi-
sion by the state"' — is understandably appropriate for deciding whether
Parker should apply to actions of the state itself. Under the first element of the
Court's standard, that the challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy, there will be very few instances when
allegedly anticompetitive state activity cannot fulfill this requirement. There will
almost certainly be a state statute authorizing the allegedly anticompetitive ac-
tivity. A statute was involved, for instance, in each of the cases in which the
Court considered the applicability of the Parker doctrine to the activities of a
state. 1 " If the state legislature, however, has not authorized the state to act in the
allegedly anticompetitive manner, the exemption is not applicable. In ef-
fect, with the requirement of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy, the Court has insured that the decision to engage in anticompeti-
tive activity is made by the appropriate authority in the state. That is, the deci-
sion will be made by the legislative rather than, for instance, an administrative
body.
144 But see Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968).
145 City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412.
146 "Dillon's Law" of municipal power is a classic statement of the limits of the powers
of a municipality.
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation — not simply convenient, but indispensible.... All acts beyond the
scope of the power granted are void.
1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 237 (5th ed. 1911).
' 47 Micical Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105.




The second element of the Court's standard, that the state actively super-
vise the policy, is also logical when applied to state activity. The requirement of
active state supervision is merely a reaffirmation of what the Court had
recognized in Parker: a state cannot give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring their action is
lawful.'"
The standard developed by the Supreme Court could also be adequately
applied to allegedly anticompetitive private activity directed by the state.' 5°
Although the Court has not had the opportunity to consider the applicability of
the state action exemption to private activity since Cantor a. Detroit Edison Co.
(which was decided before the Court clearly articulated the current standard),
the application of the Court's standard to allegedly anticompetitive private ac-
tivity directed by the state seems appropriate. If private anticompetitive activi-
ty is required by a state statute, and the two elements of the Court's standard
are satisfied, the activity would therefore be exempt from the antitrust laws
under the Parker doctrine. If allegedly anticompetitive private activity, directed
by the state pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy, actively supervised by the state, was not exempt under the Parker doc-
trine, irrational results would obtain. For instance it would be irrational to hold
a private actor liable for violations of the antitrust laws if the private actor was
merely following a state command. In addition, the Parker doctrine is here ap-
plied to those situations in which the state has explicitly decided to use private
means to effectuate its policy. If the state decides to use private means to effec-
tuate policy, that policy should be clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed,
and supervised by the state. If the state is not involved at least to this extent,
the state action exemption should not be applied."' In essence, where either
the state expressly adopts and supervises an anticompetitive activity itself, or
does so through a private actor, then the antitrust laws should not apply. In
both situations the action is being taken to further the public good. Whether
the activity is carried on by the state itself or by a private actor at the request of
the state, the antitrust laws should not apply, as long as a public goal is served.
To ignore this would be to frustrate social and economic legislation in a man-
ner unintended by Congress.' 52
(West 1964)); Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. at 103 (California Automobile Franchise Act, CAL. VEH.
CODE CC 3062-3063 (West Supp. 1978)); Bales, 433 U.S. at 355 (17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. Rule
29(a) (1973)); Parker, 317 U.S. at 344 (California Agricultural Prorate Act, Statute of Cal. of
1933, c. 754).
'" Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 386 (1951); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344-47 (1904).
1 " As Goldfarb indicates, the threshold question in cases dealing with private anticompe-
titive activity is whether the activities were compelled by the state acting as sovereign. Goldfarb,
421 U.S. at 791.
"' E.g., Mideal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 103-06.
152 In Parker, the Court itself noted that the Sherman Act was a prohibition on individual
and not state action. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. The Court also noted that there is "no suggestion of
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Although requiring both that an affirmative state policy be adopted and
that it be supervised by the state is reasonable where state and private activities
are involved, this standard is inappropriate where the activities of a municipali-
ty are called into question. First, the application of the same standard requiring
a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy effectively denies
municipalities the right to regulate matters in the local economy.'" For the
Court to require the governmental unit which is closest to the people,' 54 and
most responsive to their needs, to have state approval of all local regulations
seems unproductive.' 55 This requirement of state approval could have the ef-
fect of making municipalities merely administrative arms of the state with no
real control over local conditions. 156 Second, the requirement that the state ac-
tively supervise the implementation of the policy will prove equally restrictive
to municipalities. As the dissent in Community Communications stated, requiring
the state to actively supervise the policy will lead to a situation in which the
state is virtually controlling the municipalities.'" That is, in order to defend
itself from Sherman Act attacks, a municipality will have to cede authority
back to the state,'" allowing the state to supervise any potentially anticompeti-
tive activity.
The difficulties likely to result from applying the Court's standard to
municipalities is illustrated by the result in Community Communications. By
choosing to apply its standard in a mechanical fashion, the Court insured that
the city of Boulder would not benefit from the state action exemption. Boulder,
however, as a municipality, is a government body. As a result, many of its ac-
tivities are directed towards increasing public welfare. In neglecting this fact,
the Court appears to be drifting away from the most important .distinction
made in Parker: the distinction between state (governmental) action and private
action.'" As noted, where a government body is legitimately acting to enhance
a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was
ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only 'business combina-
tions.' " Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (quoting 21 CoNG. REC. 2562, 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen.
Sherman).
1 " Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See supra note 135.
"5 Many types of municipal regulations could have antitrust implications. See Rose,
Municipal Activities and the Antitrust Laws After City of Lafayette, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 483, 486-87,
489-515 (1980) (identifying types of municipal activities likely to give rise to antitrust litigation).
16 If municipalities are viewed as mere administrative arms of the state, the distinction
between municipal corporations and non-municipal public corporations would be eliminated.
The distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation is that it is a "body politic." 1 Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS $ 2.07a (3d ed. 1971). A non-municipal public corpora-
tion is defined as a corporation created by the state "solely as its own device and agency for the
accomplishment of some part of its own public work other than the local government.... " Id. at
S 2.03b.
'" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"8 Id.
138 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. "There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action
in the 'Sherman] Act's legislative history... That its purpose was to suppress combinations to
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the general welfare, and in so doing uses an anticompetitive mechansim, the
antitrust laws should not apply to invalidate the action. This rationale would
seem to apply whether the government involved is a state or a municipality. By
using the requirement that the state be the body to adopt the policy and oversee
its implementation, the Court has effectively precluded municipalities from
taking affirmative action towards many social and economic goals.
The most likely objection to this notion — that states and municipalities
should be treated similarly for antitrust purposes when fulfilling similar
government goals — is that in the federalist system, states have an independent
existence and municipalities do not. Arguably, the two levels of government
should, therefore, be treated differently. In Community Communications, the
Court correctly emphasized that the Parker state action exemption is based
upon the doctrine of federalism.' 60 As the dissent in Community Communications
notes, however, federalism is likewise implicated when federal law invalidates
municipal legislation."' Yet, the Court never clearly explains why federalism
is not involved when a municipal ordinance is held invalid. Rather, relying on
an 1886 decision, the Court merely notes that only the state and federal
governments exist "within the broad domain of sovereignty." 1 62 Accordingly
the court's discussion of whether federalism is implicated when a municipal or-
dinance is invalidated is insufficient, particularly since Community Communica-
tions represents the first time a majority of the Court has agreed on the inappli-
cability of the Parker exemption to municipalities. 163 Despite the Court's pro-
nouncement, there is merit to the dissent's argument that federalism is im-
plicated when a city ordinance is declared invalid. A municipality is limited to
acting on those matters for which it has been given authority to act by the
state.'" By granting municipalities the power to act on certain matters, a state
makes a conscious decision on how it wants these matters governed. If this
decision of the state is denied effect by the federal government, federalism is
necessarily implicated.
The mechanical application of the Court's multi-purpose standard to the
allegedly anticompetitive activity in Community Communications led to results
that are inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Parker doctrine. Parker
restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations abundantly appears
from its legislative history." Id. (emphasis added). The Sherman Act "must be taken as a pro-
hibition of individual and not state action." Id. at 352.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), also recognized that this was the
key distinction. "In Parker . . . the Court held that an anticompetitive marketing program . • •
was not a violation of the Sherman Act because the Act was intended to regulate private practices
and not to prohibit a state from imposing a restraint as an act of government." Id. at 788.
' 6° Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 50.
16 ' Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 53-54 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)).
163
 In the only other case to consider municipal activity, City of Lafayette, the Court had
been sharply divided. See supra note 30.
16 ' For a description of the powers a municipality can exercise, see supra note 146.
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was concerned with exempting state (governmental) action from the antitrust
laws,'" and limiting the application of those laws to the entities Congress in-
tended the laws to apply to: individuals and corporations.'" By forcing the
municipality to satisfy the same requirements as state activity and private ac-
tivity in order for the Parker exemption to be applicable, the Court once again,
as it had in the cases that had developed the multi-purpose test, failed to
recognize the important distinctions between state activity, private activity and
municipal activity. Because of the differences between these distinct types of
activities, there are different sets of reasons to consider in determining the ap-
plicability of the Parker exemption to each type of activity. By mechanically ap-
plying its test, rather than considering the unique status of municipalities, the
Court reached results inconsistent with the purpose of the Parker exemption.
This inconsistency was particularly evident in Community Communications
because the Court was dealing with a special type of municipality — a home
rule municipality. This casenote will demonstrate that a home rule municipali-
ty, when acting in areas of local concern, is so similar to a state that the state
action exemption should apply, and the Court should examine whether the
municipality has a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy to
replace competition with regulation.
B. State Action and Home Rule Municipalities
In Community Communications, the Supreme Court was so concerned with
the notion of dual (federal-state) sovereignty that it refused to recognize the
uniqueness of a home rule municipality.'" The city of Boulder argued that be-
cause of the home rule amendment,'" Boulder was acting as the state when it
enacted the allegedly anticompetitive ordinance, and accordingly was entitled
to the Parker exemption.'" Relying on its dual sovereignty-federalism reason-
ing, the Court failed to seriously consider the city's argument.'" This failure,
and the Court's consequent failure to recognize that in matters of purely local
concern a home rule municipality has all the powers of the sovereign state, 17 '
leads the Court to a result that is inconsistent with the purpose of the Parker
doctrine and created two flaws in the Court's analysis.
First, Parker, the case which began the development of the state action ex-
emption, was decided before the substantial growth in constitutional home rule
amendments.' 72 It is unlikely, therefore, that the Parker Court ever contem-
166 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
167 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 53-54.
"ll See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
166 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52-53.
' 7° See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
172 Parker was decided in 1943. Substantial growth in the number of states with home
rule amendments has occurred since World War II. See supra note 77.
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plated that states would cede their power on local matters to their municipal
governments. In Community Communications, the Court also ignores the fact that
constitutional home rule is a relatively recent development. As support for its
dual sovereignty argument, the Court cites a case decided in 1886,'" years be-
fore the existence of home rule municipalities. The Court apparently is at-
tempting to fit a completely new situation into an outdated method of analysis.
This type of procrustean analysis detracts greatly from the force of the Court's
argument because it is an indication that the Court's straightforward applica-
tion of its test was made without a careful consideration of home rule munici-
palities.
Second, even if the Court's starting point, that "ours is a dual system of
government," is accepted, a proper analysis of a case involving a home rule
municipality leads to a result different from that reached by the Court in Com-
munity Communications. It is clear that states are sovereign entities. 14 In Col-
orado, the state constitution gives municipalities exclusive authority in matters
of purely local concern.' 75 Assuming, as the Court did, that the regulation of
cable television is a matter of local concern,' 76 the federal government should
respect a municipal ordinance concerning cable television, since the state con-
stitution has granted municipalities exclusive authority to enact such an or-
dinance.'" In other words, in matters of local concern, the municipality is act-
ing as the state. Consequently, in determining the applicability of the Parker ex-
emption, it would have been more enlightening for the Court to apply the
"clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed policy" test to the municipality.
That is, the Court should have determined if the municipality had a clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed policy to replace competition with regula-
tion in a matter of local concern.' 78
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court should
not interfere with the states' (and its people's) decision to grant municipalities
exclusive authority to act on matters of purely local concern by denying home
rule municipalities the exemption to the antitrust laws that the states enjoy.
Home rule municipalities, acting on matters of purely local concern, should
therefore be exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine.
The Court, however, would not accept such an argument because it felt to
do so would allow each city in Colorado to pursue its own policy towards cable
television (regulation, monopoly, or competition). 179
 The Court reasoned that
this would "wholly eviscerate" the requirement of clear articulation and af-
firmative expression "that our precedents require."'" This reasoning of the
1 " United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886) quoted in Community Communica-
tions, 455 U.S. at 54-54.
1 " See, e.g., Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 53-54.
175 COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (1980). See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
"6 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 53 n.16.
17 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
"a
 This was the approach the Court of Appeals took in Community Communications. See
supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
'" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 56.
180 Id.
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Court is faulty because it both misapplies the Court's precedents and misinter-
prets the logic of federalism. First, Community Communications was the First time
the Court considered the applicability of the state action exemption to a home
rule municipality. The standard by which the Court determined the applicabil-
ity of the exemption (clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy) was developed by the Court in cases that dealt with a variety of ac-
tivities (state, private and municipal) between which the Court failed to make
distinctions.'" Because the precedents represent an intermingling of a variety
of different types of situations, and because in Community Communications the
Court was faced with a completely new issue, the precedents do not clearly re-
quire that the Court's standard be applied to determine if home rule
municipalities are exempt from the antitrust laWs. Second, the faults in the
Court's logic can be demonstrated. If cable television is a matter of local con-
cern, 182 as the Court assumes, it should logically be regulated at the local level.
Under the principles of federalism, the federal government should not require
the states to regulate matters of local concern. It is not vital to federalism that
matters of local concern be regulated at the state, rather than municipal
level. 183
Under the Court's approach, however, in order for any regulation to be ex-
empt from the antitrust laws under the Parker exemption, there must be in-
volvement by the state. The Court fails to see the paradox this requirement of
state involvement creates.'" In Colorado, a home rule municipality has ex-
clusive authority in matters of local concern.'" Yet, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Community Communications mandates a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed state policy in order for municipal activity to be exempt from
the antitrust laws.'" But, in Colorado, the state cannot give a clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy to replace competition with regu-
lation in matters of local concern because its municipalities have exclusive au-
' 8 ' See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text,
1" It is debatable whether cable television is a matter of local concern. In Manor Vail
Condominium Ass'n v, Vail, the Colorado Supreme Court considered an ordinance regulating
cable television and implied that it was a matter of local concern, noting that local governments
have wide latitude in regulating local economies. Manor Vail Condominium Ass'n v. Vail, 199
Colo. 62, 66, 604 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1980). In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., the
Supreme Court held that cable television systems are engaged in interstate commerce. United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968). Perhaps it would have been
more profitable for the Court, in Community Communications, to determine if cable television is an
area of local concern, thus determining whether Boulder even had the authority to enact the or-
dinance.
188 Since states can displace competition with regulation, allowing the states to delegate
this power to home rule municipalities in matters of local concern would not greatly alter the ef-
fectiveness of the antitrust laws.
184 Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435,
449 (1980); Thomas, City of Lafayette's State Action Test Reformulated: A Meaningful Standard for An-
titrust Immunity for Cities, 1980 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 345, 372 (1980).
'" Four County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 304, 369 P.2d 67, 77 (1962).
188 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52.
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thority in such matters. The Court developed standard and the concept of
home rule municipalities are inherently inconsistent. Applying the Court's
standard, home rule municipalities will never be able to take advantage of the
state action exemption.'$" In order to satisfy the Court's standard for determin-
ing the applicability of the state action exemption, home rule municipalities
would have to cede some power back to the states. 188 This would no doubt ap-
peal to states eager to regain the power granted to municipalities when home
rule amendments were inserted into states' constitutions.
In Community Communications, the Court failed to give adequate attention
to Boulder's status as a home rule municipality, and the effect that home rule
status should have on the application of the state action doctrine. Furthermore,
the Court did not consider the implications of the decision for municipalities
and for the enforcement of the antitrust laws. The final section of this casenote
will consider the implications of the Court's decision in Community Communica-
tions, focusing on the implications of the decision for home rule municipalities.
C. The Implications of Community Communications
In Community Communications, the Court's use of a clearly articulated
standard eliminated some of the confusion surrounding the applicability of the
state action exemption to municipalities. The Court's standard, however, also
greatly increases municipalities' vulnerability to possible antitrust suits. 189 In
Community Communications, the Court continued its recent trend of limiting the
use of the Parker state action doctrine. By adopting an extremely narrow view of
the Parker doctrine, the Court indicated an unwillingness to allow municipali-
ties to regulate the economy in an anticompetitive manner.
Despite its adoption of a clearly articulated standard, the Court in Com-
munity Communications left unanswered many questions with significant implica-
187 Areeda, supra note 184, at 449; Thomas, supra note 184, at 372.
188 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As Justice
Rehnquist notes, perhaps this fact that home rule municipalities may have to cede power back to
the state explains why 23 states Filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court in support of the Com-
munity Communications Company. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 71 n. I (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
1 " Antitrust suits have recently been brought against municipalities challenging such
activities as ambulance services, sewage treatment services and the operation of parking facilities.
Gold Cross Ambulance and Tranfer and Standby Serv. Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d
1005, 1007-08 (Bth Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. July 25, 1983) (No.
83-138) (challenging city's implementation of a single operator ambulance system to provide all
of city's emergency and nonemergency ambulance service); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 700 F. 2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. May 11,
1983) (No. 82-1832) (challenging city's refusal to sell sewage treatment services to surrounding
areas unless the areas were annexed to the city); Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664, 665-66 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (challenging city's action of granting
tenants of Cincinnati's Riverfront Stadium the right, pursuant to a lease, to prevent Coliseum
patrons from using the parking facility while the stadium is in use).
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tions for the antitrust laws, the state action doctrine, and municipalities. One
of these issues is the future use of the Court developed standard for determin-
ing the applicability of the state action doctrine. Having decided that Boulder
failed to meet the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy"
requirement, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the second part of the
standard, which requires active state supervision of the allegedly anticompeti-
tive activity. 190 If the Court determines, in subsequent cases, that it is neces-
sary for the state to actively supervise the implementation of the policy in order
for municipalities to be exempt from the antitrust laws, this could, as the dis-
sent notes, lead to a virtual takeover of municipalities by the states.' 9 ' Since
many types of municipal activity could lead to claims of antitrust violations,' 92
in order for a municipality to protect itself under the Court developed stand-
ard, it would have to permit the state to both "articulate" and "supervise" the
"municipal" policy. If the Court determines, however, in subsequent cases
that municipalities do not have to satisfy the state supervision requirement for
the exemption to be applicable, the Court would be admitting that municipal
activity has to be treated differently from other types of activity. In deciding
whether to apply the active state supervision requirement to determine the ap-
plicability of the state action exemption to municipalities, the Court will
therefore have to choose between requiring the state to articulate and supervise
municipal policy or recognizing that municipal activity is a unique type of ac-
tivity. 193
Although the question of the applicability of both parts of the Court's
standard could have substantial implications for municipalities in general, the
Community Communications decision has even greater implications for home rule
municipalities. The Court's mandate, that municipal activity be pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy in order to qualify for the state action exemp-
tion, is directly in conflict with the purposes of home rule.
1 " Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 51 n.14.
1' Id. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192 See supra note 155.
I" Subsequent to Community Communications, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have held
that the active state supervision standard is not applicable to the alleged anticompetitive activity
of a municipality. Gold Cross Ambulance and Transfer And Standby Serv., Inc. v. City of Kan-
sas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S.
July 25, 1983) (No. 83-138); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 383-84 (7th
Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. May 11, 1983) (No. 82-1832). See
Pueblo Aircraft Serv. Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 809-11 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied 103
S. Ct. 762 (1983).
Regardless of what standard the Supreme Court uses, if the Court does find that
municipal activity violated the antitrust laws, the Court would still be faced with the difficult
issue of remedies, an issue which the Court did not consider in Community Communications. Com-
munity Communications, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20. The Court refused to consider whether municipalities
would be liable for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The Clayton Act states that an in-
jured party "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. 5 15 (1976). A federal district court has held that a





There are two major reasons for the enactment of home rule amendments.
One reason is to eliminate some of the authority the legislature has over a
municipality and to give municipalities full self government in matters of local
concern.'" Another reason for home rule is to relieve the legislature of the
burden of handling local matters.'" The Court's decision in Community Com-
munications destroys the rationale behind home rule, and makes the exercise of
home rule power a dangerous gamble. Municipalities are free to use their home
rule powers, but it they want the protection of the state action exemption from
the antitrust laws, they had better make sure they act pursuant to a clearly ar-
ticulated state policy. The Court's decision to require that home rule
municipalities satisfy the same requirements as private corporations and state
agencies in order to be exempt under the Parker doctrine both misconstrues the
Parker doctrine as it was initially enunciated,'" and fails to consider the unique
status of home rule municipalities.' 97 As the dissent in Community Communica-
tions notes, the Court's decision "effectively destroys" the home rule move-
ment. 198
Home rule municipalities would be able to function safely and effectively if
the Supreme Court had adopted the analysis used by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in deciding Community Communications.'" The Court of Appeals
reasoned that because of the home rule amendment, Boulder had all the power
of the state in matters of local concern. 200 After equating the municipality's ac-
tivity with state activity, the Court of Appeals felt justified in applying the
"clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed and actively supervised" test to
the actions of Boulder itself. 20 ' Since Boulder's policy was clearly articulated,
and the city actively supervised the policy, the Court of Appeals held the or-
dinance exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine. 202
 If the
Mun. Util. 526 F. Supp. 276, 281-82 (F.D. Cal. 1981). Unless the Supreme Court is willing to
rewrite the Clayton Act for Congress, municipalities will be liable for treble damages for viola-
tions of the antitrust laws. The payment of a large treble damage award would have a disastrous
financial impact on any municipality. The only consolation for municipalities concerned about
incurring such liabilities is that the Court has implied that it might apply the antitrust laws dif-
ferently in cases involving municipalities. "Certain activities, which might appear an-
ticompetitive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted
by a local government." City Of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48, quoted in Community Communica-
tions, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20.
154 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 5 3.2lb (3d ed. 1971).
'" Shalvoy v. Curran, 393 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1968).
196 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
'" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'" 630 F,2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
200 Id. at 706-07.
20 ' Id. at 708.
202 Id. For another case applying this analysis, see Pueblo Aircraft Serv. Inc. v, City of
Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205, 1209-11 (D. Colo. 1980), aff'd 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982) (apply-
ing analysis used by Supreme Court in Community Communications), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 762
(1983).
1428	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 24:1399
issue of the applicability of the exemption is approached in this manner, the
governmental activities of a home rule municipality would be exempt from the
antitrust laws, and the Court's application of the standard it developed (for ex-
ample, did the municipality have a clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed policy) would not produce the awkward and unfortunate results pro-
duced in Community Communications.
CONCLUSION
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, the Supreme Court held
that the allegedly anticompetitive activities of a home rule municipality are not
exempt from the antitrust laws unless the action was taken pursuant to a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. In applying this standard,
the Court found that Boulder's ordinance, which restricted the expansion of a
cable television company, was not exempt under the state action doctrine. The
standard the Court applied, however, was derived from a variety of situations
involving private activity directed by the state, municipal activity and state ac-
tivity. In developing this standard, the Court made no distinctions between
these different types of activities. The application of this standard to these dif-
ferent types of activities therefore produces inconsistent and unfortunate
results. This is particularly so when the standard is applied so that a home rule
municipality must have the state clearly articulate and affirmatively express an
anticompetitive policy on a matter of purely local concern in order for the ac-
tivity to be exempt from the antitrust laws. The Court's decision in Community
Communications also raises serious doubts about the continued existence and
viability of home rule municipalities and threatens a return to total state con-
trol of municipal affairs. In light of these problems, the Court should recognize
that the distinctions between private, state and municipal activity make it im-
possible to apply the same standard to determine the applicability of the Parker
exemption in situations involving these different types of activities. In par-
ticular, the Court should recognize that in matters of local concern the home
rule municipality (in Colorado) is acting as the state. The applicability of the
Parker exemption to a home rule municipality acting in a matter of local con-
cern should therefore be determined by ascertaining whether the municipality,
and not the state, had a clearly articulated policy to replace competition with
regulation.
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